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NOTES
REGULATION OF ADVERTISING AND
PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The rising public controversy over the depletion of conventional
energy resources and the viability of alternative energy sources has
focused increased attention upon corporate and governmental activities related to these concerns.' The energy crisis has prompted some
governmental authorities responsible for the regulation of public
utility corporations to restrict the means by which the utilities disseminate corporate opinion on energy policies; specifically, by banning the use of inserts in utility bills.' In addition, in at least one
jurisdiction, all promotional advertising by utility companies has
been prohibited.'
This Note will examine the status of the first amendment rights
of utility corporations in light of recent legal challenges by several
New York utilities to state imposed restraints on their communications with utility subscribers and the public in general.' This exami1. That this nation's energy problems have reached crisis proportions has been amply
reported by the news media over the past several years. See, e.g., The Energy Mess, TIME,
July 2, 1979, at 14-27. The New York Court of Appeals has gone so far as to take judicial
notice of the energy crisis, which it deemed a compelling justification for banning promotional
advertising by public utility corporations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 110, 390 N.E.2d 749, 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 39 (1979).
2. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub. Utils., .No.
27,052 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1977); Boushey v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 10
PUR4th 23 (Cal. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
3. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub. Utils., No.
27,052 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1977). See also Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group,
Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 331 N.E.2d 730 (1975). In this case, the
court upheld the dismissal of a complaint filed with the utilities commission seeking an order
compelling public utilities to cease advertising and promotional practices. The dismissal
followed the enactment of an act by the state legislature prohibiting the commission from
limiting the right of any public utility to engage in promoting development or advertising;
State v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1975) (court overruled
state Corporation Commission order prohibiting utilities from making expenditures for promotional advertising).
4. See, e.g. cases cited in note 10 infra.
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nation will focus on the regulations promulgated by the New York
Public Service Commission which prohibited the use of bill inserts
on controversial matters of public policy and banned all promotional advertising by public utility corporationsA
I.

Background and Nature of the Controversy

The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) is a public authority with general powers of supervision and regulation over the
activities of gas and electric utilities.' Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation (Central Hudson) and Consolidated Edison Company (Con Edison) are
public utility companies subject to regulation by the PSC.7
The PSC, as a result of a comprehensive review of its policy concerning advertising by regulated utilities, issued an order precluding
promotional advertising by public utilities.8 Additionally, the PSC
announced a ban on the use of bill inserts by utilities as a means of
communicating their views on "controversial matters of public policy."' Several utilities regulated by the PSC filed lawsuits challenging the order. 10 Con Edison claimed the ban on bill inserts infringed
5. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub. Utils., No.
27,052 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1977).
6. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 65-66 (McKinney 1976).
7. Id. §§ 64, 66.
8. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub. Utils., No.
27,052, at 5-7 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1977). The ban on promotional advertising
of natural gas was initially imposed in October, 1971 and incorporated in the PSC Statement
of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices by Pub. Utils., 12 N.Y. PSC 108-R (June
21, 1972); the ban on promotional advertising of electricity was initially imposed in 1973 in
response to the energy crisis generated by the oil embargo and was incorporated in the 1977
policy statement. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub.
Utils., No. 27,052, at 5.
9. Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Pub. Utils., No.
27,052, at 10-11 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1977). The PSC felt that the use of bill
inserts should be prohibited in order to preclude the utility companies from taking advantage
of the captive audience of utility subscribers. Id. See notes 62-83 infra and accompanying
text.
10. Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA)
1241 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7374 (2d Cir. May 31, 1979),
expedited review denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3449 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1980) (No. 79-629); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 93 Misc.2d 313, 402 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d
749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), prob. juris, noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1979) (No.
79-134); Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 1131777 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 1978), modified, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1978), affl'd,
47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356
(U.S. Nov. 27, 1979) (No. 79-565).
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upon its constitutional right of free speech insofar as it restricted a
utility's ability to communicate freely with its customers." Central
Hudson attacked the ban on promotional advertising as an impermissible restriction of commercial free speech."2 LILCO challenged
the order on both grounds.' 3
In Con Edison and Central Hudson, the Supreme Court of New
York ruled that the ban on bill inserts was permissible while the
prohibition of promotional advertising was unconstitutional." The
appellate division reversed the decision on promotional advertising,
declaring the PSC order constitutional. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the appellate division." The court distinguished
between governmental regulations directed at the content of speech
and regulations which, while not directed at speech itself, affect the
free flow of information." Governmental regulations directed at suppressing communication on the basis of content must be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny; absent a compelling justification, a
content-oriented restriction may not stand." On the other hand, the
validity of a regulation which is not aimed at the content of communication, but merely at the time, place, or manner of communication, is determined by balancing the various competing interests
involved, with due regard for the special status of first amendment
rights." The court of appeals held that the prohibition of bill in11. Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 93 Misc.2d 313, 314, 402
N.Y.S.2d 551, 551-52 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1978),
aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
12. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 11317-77
(Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 1978), modified, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1978), aff'd,
47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
13. Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 5 MED. L. RFP. (BNA)
1241 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1979).
14. 93 Misc. 2d at 316-17, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
15. 63 A.D.2d at 370, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
16. 47 N.Y.2d at 110, 390 N.E.2d at 758, 417 N.Y.S. at 39.
17. Id. at 105-07, 390 N.E.2d at 754-56, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 35-37.
18. Id. at 105, 390 N.E.2d at 754, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105 (1973). The Court reversed disorderly conduct conviction of individual who had
shouted "We'll take the fucking street" at a college antiwar demonstration. The Court found
this statement to be protected speech and ruled that there was no showing that substantial
privacy interests were being invaded in an intolerable manner or that the words were intended
to and likely to produce imminent lawless action. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (state statute proscribing advocacy of the use of force held to be an unconstitutional restriction on the subject matter of speech).
19. 47 N.Y. 2d at 105-06, 390 N.E.2d at 754-55, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36. The Supreme Court
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serts was not directed at the content of speech and thus fell within
the second category of free speech regulations."0 The court then
found that the ban on inserts was a valid regulation of communication since it was not content-oriented, served significant governmental interests and left open ample alternative channels of communication.2

The New York Court of Appeals also upheld the ban on promotional advertising.22 The court held that commercial speech was not
to be afforded the same degree of protection as other types of
speech." The court decided that the degree of first amendment
protection to be afforded to commercial advertising is dependent
upon a societal interest in receiving the particular information
under consideration for informed and reliable economic decisionmaking. 2' The ban on advertising was upheld because the court
could find no significant public interest in receiving promotional
advertising from utility corporations which operated in a noncompetitive market.2 5
In LILCO, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis2
trict of New York rendered its judgment on the very same issues.
Contrary to the New York Court of Appeals, the district court ruled
that the ban on bill inserts was clearly content-oriented,2 7 Neverthehas stated often that the state may reasonably regulate the time, place, or manner of speech.
See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (statute upheld which forbid the use on public
streets of sound trucks or any instrument which emitted a loud and raucous noise); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (state statute requiring license for parades on public
streets held constitutional). See also Virginia State Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
20. 47 N.Y.2d at 105, 390 N.E.2d at 754, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
21. Id. at 105-07, 390 N.E.2d at 755-56, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
22. Id. at 107-10, 390 N.E.2d at 756-58, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 37-39.
23. Id. at 107, 390 N.E.2d at 756, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 37. The doctrine that traditional free
speech analysis did not apply to commercial speech and that such communication was more
susceptible to governmental regulation originated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). The Supreme Court repudiated this doctrine in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court did note, however,
that some regulations, intolerable where normal free speech was involved, might be acceptable in relation to commercial speech. Id. at 770-73. See pt. III infra.
24. 47 N.Y.2d at 108-09, 390 N.E.2d at 756-57, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
25. Id. at 109-10, 390 N.E.2d at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39.
26. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1241 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1979). The decision was rendered
as a result of a summary judgement motion by LILCO. Id.
27. Id. at 1253.
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less, the ban was upheld."8 The district court did not apply traditional free speech analysis of content-oriented restrictions, which
would have required a compelling justification for the ban. The
court held that such analysis is required only if a public forum is
involved.2 9 Where no public forum is implicated, reasonable governmental restrictions on speech may be sustained provided they are
not arbitrary, capricious, or invidious. The court found that the
billing mechanism was not a public forum where traditional free
speech analysis is to be applied. 3 The court further recognized several significant governmental interests served by banning bill inserts.32 Since the regulation was not found to be arbitrary,
capri33
cious, or invidious, the ban on bill inserts was upheld.
The ban on promotional advertising, however, was held invalid. 3'
The district court acknowledged that commercial speech was entitled to first amendment protection. 31 In determining that the ban
on advertising was constitutionally infirm, the court applied a balancing of interests test.3 LILCO had an obvious interest in continuing its communication of commercial information.3 7 Furthermore,
the court ruled that the public had a substantial interest in receiving truthful advertising from the utility. 8 The court found no gov28. Id. at 1255.
29. Id. at 1254.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1255. The court listed several reasonable justifications for the ban: the risk of
imposing on a captive audience, the appearance of favoritism toward the utilities' point of
view on controversial issues and the difficulties inherent in counteracting that appearance
by permitting other points of view, the inevitable charges of improper conduct when the PSC
is placed in the position of arbitrating fair access for opposing views, preserving the billing
mechanism as a means of disseminating useful information, and avoiding the risk of creating
a public forum out of the billing process. Id.
33. Id. at 1254-55.
34. Id. at 1255.
35. Id. at 1233-34. For a summary of the growth of first amendment protection of commercial speech, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758-73 (1976).
36. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1245.
37. Id.
38. Id. The district court found that there was a general public interest in the free flow
of commercial information on the use of electrical energy for home heating, in assisting the
consumer's decision in selecting from among the types of heating sources available, in
making economic decisions concerning the benefits and detriments of electrical heat and in
providing society with information necessary for ecologically sound, efficient utilization of
energy resources. Id.
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FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

ernmental interest which outweighed the corporation's first amendment right to conduct promotional advertising and, therefore, invalidated the ban on promotional advertising."

II. The Ban on Bill Inserts and the First Amendment
As a general rule, the first amendment guarantee of free speech
precludes governmental regulation of the content of speech absent
a compelling justification. 0 To be distinguished are regulations promulgated to further legitimate, significant governmental interests
which do not restrict unduly the exercise of protected rights." Reasonable regulations may be imposed on the time, place, or manner
of the exercise of first amendment rights." Such restrictions have
been deemed acceptable provided they leave open ample alternative
channels of communication, serve a significant governmental interest, and are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. 3
The Con Edison and LILCO courts utilized the criteria for a reasonable time, place, or manner regulation in examining the PSC

order." The New York Court of Appeals found that the prohibition
39. Id. at 1245-47. The asserted governmental interest was to curb the growth of energy
consumption in New York. Id. at 1246-47.
40. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). See also First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In this case, several banking corporations
challenged a statute which prohibited them from making contributions or expenditures designed to influence the outcome of political referendums. The Supreme Court noted that the
state could prevail only by demonstrating a compelling state interest. Id. at 786-87. The Court
found that no such interest was shown and invalidated the statute. Id. at 795.
Assuming the state demonstrates a compelling interest, the means chosen to meet that
interest must be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
41. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (trespass conviction of individuals who
demonstrated on a nonpublic county jail driveway upheld because statute represented reasonable regulation on place of speech); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (nondiscriminatory statute against obstructing public passages upheld as reasonable restriction on
place of speech).
42. See note 41 supra. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
43. 425 U.S. at 771.
44. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1252; 47 N.Y.2d at 105-07, 390 N.E.2d at 754-56, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 36-37. Both courts apparently accepted the proposition that corporations enjoy
first amendment protection as do other persons. In First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which prohibited busi-
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on the use of bill inserts was not aimed at the content of speech and
thus did not require a compelling justification. 5 In the court's analysis the PSC order did not extend to
all speech of a prescribed content, but only to one manner of communication.
No one viewpoint is singled out for special treatment, nor is the general right
to express ideas in other forums affected. In short, the PSC is concerned with
but one particular means of expression, and then only to a limited extent."

In direct contrast, the district court in LILCO felt that the PSC
order did not fit "the classic mold of a time, place or manner restriction" and was clearly content-oriented. 7
A. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
The government may reasonably regulate the time, place, or manner of speech provided the regulation leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication, serves a substantial governmental interest, and is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. 8 The express purpose of the PSC order was to ban the
utilization of one means of disseminating corporate opinion on controversial issues, the billing process." The order did not purport to
absolutely preclude utilities from advocating nuclear power or other
policies.5" The utilities argued that other available means, particularly television, radio, and separate mailings, were either prohibitively expensive or less effective." Both the New York and district
courts remained unimpressed. The New York court in Con Edison
felt that numerous alternative channels remained open and accessible to the utilities.2 The district court in LILCO agreed and concluded "[o]ne test that is clearly met here is the requirement of
ness corporations from making contributions or expenditures to influence the outcome of a
vote on any question submitted to the voters other than questions materially affecting the
property, business or assets of the corporation. The opinion indicates that the identity of
the speaker is an immaterial consideration in determining the scope of first amendment
rights. Id. at 776, 784.
,
45. 47 N.Y.2d at 105, 390 N.E.2d at 754-55, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
46. Id.
47. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1253.
48. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
49. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1252.
50. Id.
51. Id.; 47 N.Y.2d at 106, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
52. 47 N.Y.2d at 106, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
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ample alternative channels for communication." 53 In large measure,
this was because the very same channels of communication routinely available to anyone, including the use of the mails other than
through bill inserts, remained -open for corporate use."
In Kovacs v. Cooper5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
ample alternative channels of communication in the context, of a
time, place, or manner restriction of speech. The Court upheld a
New Jersey ordinance banning sound trucks from broadcasting in a
"loud and raucous" manner on public streets." The amplification
of the human voice, like the bill insert, was prohibited as a means
of conveying ideas. Notwithstanding the fact that loudspeakers were
more effective than public speaking or private interpersonal communication in reaching a wider audience57 or that loudspeakers may
have provided a less costly means of communication" the ordinance
was upheld. The critical factor was the existence of effective alternative channels of communication. Complete and unfettered discussion of issues and the promotion of opinions remained feasible
since such options as newspapers, pamphlets, and private conversation remained available."
Where effective alternatives for communication are available to
the speaker, a governmental regulation restricting the time, place,
or manner of speech will be upheld, assuming the two other elements of the test are also met. 0 The PSC order did not restrict the
utilities' ability to continue to communicate corporate opinion by
means of the electronic media, newspapers, and even by a direct
mailing to their subscribers; alternatives which the courts in Con
Edison and LILCO deemed adequate.
53.

5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1252.

54. Id.
55. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
56. Id. at 87.
57. Id. at 88-89.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 89. More recently, in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977), the Supreme Court emphasized that the alternative channels of communi-

cation must be more than theoretically available; they must be ones which the speaker
might realistically be expected to employ. Id. at 93. In that case, a town ordinance which
prohibited "For Sale" signs on residential property was invalidated. The Court found that
such alternatives as sound trucks and leaflets were unrealistic in marketing realty, while
relevant alternatives such as newspapers and listing with real estate agents were more
costly and provided less autonomy. Id. The Court concluded that the alternatives were
"far from satisfactory." Id.
60. See pt. II B infra.
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B.

Substantial Government Interest
The second criterion for a permissible time, place, or manner
regulation is that it serve a substantial governmental interest.6 The
interest advanced by the PSC and accepted by the court in Con
Edison was the protection of the privacy rights of the "captive audience" of utility subscribers to be free from receiving unwanted,
offensive communications. 2 Since the ratepayer would have to open
his bill, he almost surely would be confronted with the message in
the separate insert. Similarly, the court in LILCO maintained that
this would be an appropriate consideration to be weighed in regulating utilities. 3
The Supreme Court has accepted the concept that an unwilling
audience, in certain situations, should be protected against unwarranted communications. 6 To justify protection, however, the utility
subscribers must be found to be truly a "captive audience." The
Supreme Court has addressed the concept of a captive audience in
several specific situations. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,6
the city had refused to allow political campaign advertisements
within public rapid transit vehicles. In upholding the governmental
regulation, the Court recognized that the necessity of using mass
transit in modern urban society makes it impossible for the passenger to avoid the message on placards posted throughout the car. 6
Thus, the passengers constituted a captive audience."
The protection of the privacy rights of unwilling listeners was a
significant factor in the Supreme Court decision in FederalCommunications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation. In this case the
Court upheld a governmental regulation which precluded the broad61. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
62. 47 N.Y.2d at 106-07, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
63. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1253.
64. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech in radio broadcast
may be regulated in interest of unwilling listeners); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974) (political placards can be banned from publicly operated rapid transit system
in interests of captive audience of passengers); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (use of
sound trucks on public streets banned to protect captive audience of listeners).
65. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
66. Id. at 302-03. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
67. 418 U.S. at 304.
68. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

382
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casting over public airwaves of a monologue which included indecent language, stating that it was impossible to protect unwilling
listeners from the unexpected program content."'
Lehman and Pacifica illustrate circumstances in which the Supreme Court has applied the concept of protecting a captive audience. The concept itself, however, requires closer analysis. The Supreme Court has noted frequently that the state may not suppress
the dissemination of ideas merely because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful." The hostility of the recipient to the message,
therefore, is not sufficient to justify governmental regulation of communication. Furthermore, a person is often "captive" and subject
to objectionable communications outside his home, but this does
not provide a basis for regulating the first amendment rights of the
speaker." Thus, the critical factor is not whether the individual is
an unwilling recipient of a particular communication, but whether,
as an unwilling recipient, he is forced to confront the message in an
unwarranted location. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville," the
Court invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited drive-in movie
theaters from exhibiting films containing nudity where the screen
was visible from a public street. The Court rejected the city's argument that the ordinance protected the unwilling audience driving
past the theater because a passerby simply could avoid looking at
69. Id. at 748-49. The Court was careful in pointing out that of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that receives the most limited first amendment protection. Id. In large
measure, this is due to the unique nature of the medium involved and the fact that there is
only a limited number of available broadcast frequencies. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (F.C.C. fairness doctrine upheld to extent it required
broadcasters to provide response time for views contrary to their political editorials and for
victims of their criticism). See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2) (1976) (broadcaster may
be deprived of his license if F.C.C. determines that such an action serves the public interest,
convenience, and necessity); F.C.C. v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
70. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943). See also Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (in holding that a city could not deny a permit for the Jehovah's
Witnesses to use a public park for a meeting where the city had previously granted permits
for similar purposes, the Court noted that the city had denied the permit because of its
evident "disagreement ... with their views.").
71. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (conviction of individual for disturbing the
peace by wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the draft" in the corridor of the Los
Angeles Courthouse reversed despite argument that the distasteful mode of expression was
thrust upon unwilling viewers).
72. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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the screen.73 The individual was not forced to listen to or look at the
message with which he was confronted.
The captive recipient at home, however, enjoys a greater right to
privacy, one which plainly outweighs the first amendment rights of
an intruder.7" But that right resides in the individual, not the government. The Supreme Court has generally declined to uphold regulations which seek to prohibit the dissemination of information by
soliciting persons in their homes.7" Furthermore, several governmental attempts to regulate or prohibit mailings which contained otherwise protected speech have been rejected. 7 On the other hand, in
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,77 the Court upheld
a regulation which allowed an unwilling recipient to demand the
removal of his name from a particular mailing list and preclude all
future mailings from the specified sender.78 Thus, while a govern73. Id. at 210-11.
74. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
75. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (municipal ordinance requiring advance written notice be given to the police department by any person desiring to solicit
door-to-door for a "recognized" charitable cause or political cause held unconstitutionally
vague and not drawn with the narrow specificity required of a governmental regulation of first
amendment activities); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (municipal ordinance
forbidding any person to knock on doors for the purpose of distributing handbills or circulars
held invalid as a denial of freedom of speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(conviction of individuals for solicitation for religious cause from door-to-door and in public
street invalidated as impermissible restraint on speech). But see Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (under old commercial free speech doctrine, Supreme Court upheld conviction of individual who sold magazine subscriptions door-to-door in violation of an ordinance
declaring solicitation on private premises without invitation to be a nuisance).
76. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971). In this case the Court considered a federal statute
which allowed the Postmaster General to return to sender letters addressed to any person and
to prohibit the payment of postal money orders to that person if he found, on evidence
satisfactory to him, that the person was seeking money through the mails for an obscene
matter. The Court invalidated the statute as an infringement on the first amendment guarantee of free speech. In large measure, the decision was based upon the lack of prompt judicial
review of the alleged obscenity of the material. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
728 (1970), a federal statute requiring the Postmaster General to detain and deliver only upon
the addressee's request unsealed foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda" was
held unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the statute imposed an affirmative obligation
on the addressee which amounted to an unconstitutional limitation of his rights under the
first amendment.
77. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
78. Id. at 737. The Court noted that the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed
only by an affirmative act of the addressee. The Court felt that Congress provided this power
in the individual to avoid constitutional problems that might arise from vesting discretionary
authority in a governmental official. Id. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. See also
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ment regulation which allows an individual to request voluntarily
that certain mail not be sent may be permissible, one which attempts to impose an outright prohibition on mailings may not survive judicial scrutiny.
The New York court in Con Edison, and the district court in
LILCO, found the utility subscribers constituted a captive audience. 7 Both courts reasoned that the practical requirement of opening the billing envelope forced the subscriber to confront the inserted communication in an unwarranted location.' The necessity
of paying one's utility bill, however, does not require that the recipient read the accompanying inserts. Just as an unwilling listener
confronted with an offensive but protected solicitation in his home
or elsewhere may terminate the message once he determines the
contents,"' the ratepayer may avoid reading inserts he finds distasteful. Additionally, direct mailings by the utilities to their subscribers are presumably a feasible and unobjectionable means of
communicating corporate opinion on controversial issues." Although an insert may be somewhat less easily identifiable as objectionable material by an unwilling recipient, it is incongruous to
conclude the utilization of an insert rather than a separate mailing
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) where the Court, in invalidating a municipal
ordinance which forbade door-to-door solicitation, noted that a statute which would make it
an offense to solicit a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be
disturbed would leave "the decision as to whether distributers of literature may lawfully call
at home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself." Id. at 148. The Court stated,
however, that it was not expressing an opinion on the validity of such a regulation. Id. at 148
n. 13.
79. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1253. 47 N.Y.2d at 106, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at
36-37.
80. See note 79 supra.
81. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1943). It is interesting to note that
while the New York Public Service Commission argued that the ban on bill inserts was to
protect state citizens from unwarranted, offensive communications, the State of New York,
through its Motor Vehicle Commissioner, is in the business of selling lists of names to direct
mail advertisers. See Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F.Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y.), a(('d, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968). In Lamont,
the suit was brought to enjoin the sale to advertisers of the lists taken from registration
records. The plaintiffs claimed that their privacy rights were invaded as a result of the sale
of the lists. The court, in dismissing the action, noted: "The short, though regular, journey
from mail box to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is
concerned." Id. at 883.
82. Brief for Respondent at 17, 19, Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
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converts a class of utility subscribers into a "captive audience"
warranting governmentally imposed protection. As Justice John M.
Harlan once noted:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is .

.

. dependent upon a

showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively
empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections. 3

In LILCO, the district court acknowledged that a second significant governmental interest existed if corporate use of inserts could
be construed as creating a public forum. 4 If the billing process is so
controlled by the state that its very use constitutes state action,
then allowing a utility to voice its opinion in a bill insert would
obligate the PSC to provide equal opportunity for both opponents
and proponents of the utility viewpoint to employ the bill insert
medium.8 5 Furthermore, open access might result in such a substantial increase in inserted messages that desirable, noncontroversial
information might be excluded. 8 This argument rests on the premise that state sanctioned use of a facility by one party converts the
facility to a public forum which may be used by all. Nevertheless,
the process by which a utility corporation bills its customers should
not be considered a public forum merely because the utility employs
an insert to disseminate corporate opinion. State regulation of utilities does not convert the acts of an essentially private corporation
into state action.8 7 The PSC's argument that it might be creating a
public forum if it failed to prohibit the use of inserts is unpersuasive
in light of the Supreme Court decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co. 8 In that case, the Court held that the process by which
the utility terminated service to a subscriber upon reasonable notice
83. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
84. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1255. This problem was actually viewed by the court as
encompassing several potential governmental interests: the avoidance of creating a public
forum, id.; the problems inherent in placing the PSC in the position of arbitrating fair access

to the billing mechanism, id.; and the preservation of the bill insert medium for important
and useful information, id.
85. Id.
86, Id.
87. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
88. Id.
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of nonpayment of bills was not state action."s In so holding, the

Court noted:
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a
utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain
approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would be free to
institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval by a state
utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the
commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice
by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and
approved by the commission into "state action."' 0

The PSC did not order Con Edison or LILCO to utilize bill inserts.
In a time where governmental regulation pervades the economy,
regulated corporate activities ought not be viewed as state action"
or potential public forums.
The district court in LILCO mentioned two related concerns in
conjunction with the asserted governmental interests concerning the
89. Id. The Court determined that monopoly status, provision of essential services, and
the fact that the provision for termination practice had routinely been included in a general
tariff approved by the Public Utility Commission were insufficient reasons for concluding that
the actions of the utility were state action. Id. at 350-57. See also Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the court, but joined in this part by only two associate justices, held that licensing
and regulation of broadcasters by the F.C.C. did not constitute state action nor mandate that
broadcasters be compelled to accomodate the first amendment rights of others by accepting
paid political and editorial advertising).
90. 419 U.S. at 357.
91. Id. at 354. The question of whether some sort of fairness doctrine ought to be imposed
upon the billing process if the utilities employ bill inserts was not at issue in either LILCO
or Con Edison. The PSC did not attempt to impose a requirement similar to the F.C.C.
fairness doctrine which requires public broadcasters to accurately reflect opposing views on
public issues and to provide response time where a political editorial or personal attack is
presented. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969), where
the Court upheld the F.C.C. fairness doctrine to the extent it required broadcasters to afford
opponents of political editorials an opportunity to respond. Id. at 400-01. In large measure,
this was due to the unique nature of the medium, id. at 387-88, and the fact that there are
only a limited number of available frequencies. Id. at 390.
Furthermore, while such a doctrine has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the extensively regulated broadcast media (See note 69 supra) a similar governmental requirement in
regard to newspaper publishers was invalidated in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) as violating the first amendment guarantee of a free press. See also
Boushey v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 10 PUR4th 23, 43 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975) (the
utilities commission, in ruling that utilities had a right to utilize bill inserts to disseminate
corporate opinion, held that the use of inserts did not give rise to a right of enforced access
on the part of any other party).
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creation of a public forum; the appearance of favoritism toward the
utility's point of view and the difficulties inherent in counteracting
that appearance by permitting other points of view in bill inserts. 2
These arguments appear to be grounded upon an assumption that
the public, ignorant of the true state of affairs, will assume the
government has either sanctioned or encouraged the opinion expressed by the utility corporation to the exclusion of other viewpoints. While it is unclear how much reliance the district court
placed upon these asserted interests, neither the inserts nor the
billing process are state activities. 3 If the PSC perceives a need to
dissociate itself from the utilities' messages, and this is found to be
a substantial governmental interest, a more narrowly drawn regulation, of less severity than an absolute ban on inserts, would adequately serve such an interest."
Thus, neither of the asserted governmental interests, protection
of a "captive audience" and fear of creating a public forum, are
sufficient to provide the substantial governmental interest required
to support a restriction of first amendment rights.
C.

Content Oriented Regulations

The third criterion of a permissible restriction of speech is that it
must be justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech. 5 In Con Edison, the New York court applied the test premised on the court's theory that a content-oriented regulation is a
restriction which impedes the dissemination of one side or point of
view on a given issue, not one which seeks to block all discussion of
an issue. 9 The PSC order did not ban all use of bill inserts; the
regulation permitted the use of bill inserts to impart any information or opinion, unless it is a "controversial matter of public policy."97 Nor did the ban expressly discriminate against any particular
view on a public issue. Rather, entire issues were denied discussion
92. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1255.
93. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
94. For example, if it is found that the public is in fact confused as to the extent of
governmental influence over the contents of bill inserts, an appropriately worded disclaimer
should clarify the situation.
95. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
96. 47 N.Y.2d at 107, 390 N.E.2d at 755-56, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
97. Id.
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in bill inserts. The fact that, as a practical matter, it would always
be the utility's point of view that was prohibited did not affect the
analysis in Con Edison. In the limited sense that the regulation
selected topics and not opinions for exclusion, the PSC order might
seem content-neutral. The district court in LILCO implicitly rejected the logic of the New York Court of Appeals, stating "it cannot
be said that [the] PSC's ban on use of bill inserts to express views
on 'controversial issues of public policy' is unrelated to the content
of the regulated speech. Indeed, it is precisely because of the content-controversial issues-that LILCO has been denied access to
bill inserts." 8 The New York court in Con Edison, in denying that
the PSC order was content-oriented, acknowledged that a regulation directed at the content of speech required a compelling justification." The district court in LILCO also recognized that a regulation directed at the content of speech required a compelling justification, with the additional qualification that the forum must be one
appropriate for traditional analysis of regulations affecting first
amendment rights. 00
The Supreme Court has frequently discussed the concept of
content-oriented regulations. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,'1' a town ordinance which prohibited the posting of "For Sale" signs on real property was declared invalid. The
township argued that the ordinance was a reasonable restriction
on the time, place, or manner of speech. 0 The Supreme Court,
however, found that the ordinance was "not genuinely concerned
with the place of speech-front lawns-or the manner of the
speech-signs."'0 3 The township had not prohibited all lawn signs;
rather, it precluded only those dealing with the issue of sales. 04 The
Court found that the ordinance proscribed particular types of
speech based on the content.'0 The fact that the proscription applied only to one mode of communication did not transform it into
98.

5 MED. L.

REP.

(BNA) at 1253.

99. 47 N.Y.2d at 105, 390 N.E.2d at 754, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36.
100. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1254.
101. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
102. Id. at 93.

103. Id.
104.
105.

Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
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a time, place, or manner regulation.' 0 Similarly, it may be argued
that the PSC ban was not truly concerned with the place or manner
of speech, the bill insert, but with the content of speechcontroversial matters of public policy.
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, "'l the
Court considered the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance which
precluded all picketing on a public way within 150 feet of any school
building while school was in session except peaceful picketing dur,ing a labor dispute. The ordinance excluded any and all opinions,
regardless of the view advocated, unless the expression was in relation to the permissible topic, labor disputes. 0° The Court found the
statute constitutionally defective precisely because it defined permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.'"' The opinion
reaffirmed the preeminent position of the first amendment right of
free speech; the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.,",
Although the ordinance did not discriminate against particular
viewpoints, it nevertheless was found to be an impermissible
content-oriented restriction because it was selective as to the overall
subject matter of speech."'
The PSC order also discriminates on the basis of the subject
matter of the speech in question, completely banning certain broad
topics. That it avoids prohibiting the expression of any one position
does not in any sense lead to the inexorable conclusion that the
order is not content-oriented. On the contrary, the ban discriminates on the basis of content,"' as directly as did the ordinance set
aside in Mosley. The ban in Mosley precluded all picketing unless
the topic was a labor dispute. Similarly, the PSC order precluded
all use of inserts unless the topic was noncontroversial.
As a content-oriented regulation, the PSC order may be sustained
only if the state proves a compelling state interest in restricting the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1253.
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communication"' The Supreme Court has held that speech advocating the use of force or violation of law, where it is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to incite
or produce such action, meets the test of a compelling justification.'" Neither the New York court in Con Edison nor the district
court in LILCO found any such compelling justification for banning
bill inserts concerning controversial matters of public policy.
The Supreme Court has been willing to tolerate governmental
restrictions on the content of speech in certain specific situations
where a measure of conflict arises between one party's first amendment right and another's right of privacy." ' Such a conflict exists
in a situation where a utility corporation attempts to communicate
with its subscribers in the privacy of their homes. The very basic
right of a person to be secure in the privacy of his home, even to the
exclusion of otherwise protected communications, may justify appropriate regulation of another's right to communicate.", Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department"7 presented a challenge to a
federal statute which permitted an individual to request the removal of his name from a mailer's correspondence list and preclude
all future mailings. Settling the controversy required a balancing of
the first amendment right of the mailer to freely distribute information against the individual's right to privacy in his home." ' The
Court held that a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the
mailbox of an unreceptive addressee." 9 The holding was a narrow
one based upon competing constitutional interests and no general
or absolute governmental ban against mailings was considered. 2 As
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted, the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee
giving notice that he wishes no further mailing from that particular
113. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
.(1969).
114. 395 U.S. at 447.
115. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
116. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
117. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
118. Id. at 736.
119. Id. at 736-37.
120. Id. at 737. In contrast, the ban imposed by the PSC is a governmentally imposed,
absolute ban on the use of bill inserts relating to controversial matters of public policy.
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mailer,' not by a general state ban on communication. The Court
felt that Congress provided this sweeping power in the individual
not only to protect an individual's privacy right but also to avoid
potential constitutional problems that might arise from vesting the
power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a
governmental official. "2 The Court has consistently invalidated
state, as opposed to individual, efforts to prohibit communications
with persons at home on the basis of content.' Unlike the situation
in Rowan, the PSC order sought to eliminate certain communications because of their content without regard for the desires of the
individual subscriber.
2 the Court considered
In F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation,"'
the
radio broadcasting of a twelve minute "indecent" monologue entitled "Filthy Words." The nature of the medium is such that broadcast messages reach individuals, even unwilling listeners, in the
privacy of their homes, often without warning as to the content."'
The opinion acknowledged that the F.C.C. order declaring the language indecent and subject to regulation was directed at the content
of speech. 2 Because the audience is constantly tuning in, rendering
prior warnings almost useless, and because broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to even small children, it was considered appropriate to
regulate the indecent speech.2 7 The Court noted, however, that if
the offensiveness of the message to the unwilling listener could be
traced to its political content, first amendment protection might be
required.' 8 In Con Edison and LILCO, the utility corporations' use
of bill inserts did not involve the use of the broadcast media in
reaching individuals in their homes. Additionally, because the PSC
ban was directed only at inserts dealing with controversial matters
of public policy, the offensiveness of the message to the unwilling
reader must lie in the political content of the message. Although the
Supreme Court upheld a content-oriented regulation of indecent
speech in a medium entitled to only limited first amendment pro121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
See notes 75-76 supra.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 746.
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tection,'25 Pacifica does not support the imposition of a governmental regulation of the content of political speech in a mailed insert.
Another factor considered influential in balancing the right of free
speech against the individual right of privacy exists where the recipients comprise a captive audience. In Public Utilities Commission
v. Pollak,'30 the Supreme Court upheld a governmental ruling that
broadcasting radio programs in public streetcars was not a cognizable infringement of the privacy rights of the passengers, despite
their captive status. More recently, however, the Court in Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights'3 ' upheld a municipal policy of excluding
political advertising in public transit vehicles while allowing other
forms of commercial advertising. Lehman, a candidate for public
office, had argued that the advertising placards in public transit
cars constituted a public forum entitled to first amendment protection. "2 Four members of the Court were of the opinion that the city
operated transit system did not constitute a public forum and that
the managerial decision to limit placard space to commercial advertising did not rise to the level of a first amendment violation.'3 3
Justice William 0. Douglas, concurring in the judgment,'3 4 echoed
the sentiment of his dissent in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak'35 that the privacy rights of the captive audience justified
regulation of otherwise protected speech. The crux of the Lehman
decision, however, was not that the state had the right, in its discretion, to protect an unwilling audience if they could be deemed
"captive", but that the place, government operated transit cars,
was not an appropriate public forum in which traditional first
amendment considerations would apply.' 36 The four dissenting justices found that the city had opened up the transit system as a
public forum by accepting commercial advertising and as such, protection of a captive audience was not sufficiently compelling to
allow for content-oriented regulation of communication.'3 7 While it
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See note 69 supra.
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301-02, 304.
Id. at 305 (Douglas, J., concurring).
343 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
418 U.S. at 302-03.
Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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can be argued that the existence of the captive audience was one of
the factors that made the forum inappropriate, it is more reasonable
to interpret the decision as a determination that the transit system
was simply not the type of public property where first amendment
rights would prevail over all but compelling interests.,
In LILCO, the district court drew an analogy between the circumstances of Lehman and the bill insert controversy.' This evaluation
was premised upon the notion that a bill insert, or the billing process, was a forum. 40 As a consequence, the court attempted to follow
the analysis of the Lehman Court in determining whether the insert
was a "public" forum and what degree of first amendment protection was warranted.' The district court felt that such analysis was
crucial because, in its view, the general rule that content-oriented
regulations required a compelling justification was inapplicable
where a public forum did not exist.' The LILCO court relied upon
the Lehman decision for the proposition that where an activity was
not already a forum for the discussion of public issues, the state may
regulate the content of speech as long as the regulation is not arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.'
There is a fundamental difference between the situation presented in Lehman and that presented in Con Edison and LILCO.
Lehman dealt with a state-controlled activity, the transit system,
which had the potential for becoming a public forum if the state
allowed it to be utilized for the dissemination of public opinion.
Unlike some state-controlled facilities such as public streets and
parks which are natural forums for the expression of opinion, other
state-operated activities may generally be inappropriate as a forum
for the public expression of ideas.'4 4 In a situation where the forum
is normally inappropriate, unless the state creates a public forum
by allowing some use for the dissemination of ideas or opinion,'45 the
138. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (state trespass statute upheld
as applied to individuals who conducted a demonstration on county jail premises).
139. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1254-55.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1254.
143. Id.
144. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974); See also Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (all leafleting may be banned on quasi-public thoroughfares in
military bases); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
145. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). In Mosley,
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Lehman decision indicates that the state may impose a contentoriented regulation without demonstrating a compelling justification.
The issue in the utility cases, however, is not whether the insert
is or has become a public forum. The power of a city government to
regulate the use of public property or facilities under its control was
not at issue in Con Edison or LILCO as it was in Lehman. The
billing mechanism is not a public facility for which the state is
responsible in the sense that it may, in its discretion, decide to make
it available as a public forum."' It is inappropriate to categorize
speech as a forum merely because it is printed communication
mailed by a corporate person to an individual consumer. The situation presented in Con Edison and LILCO deals with essentially
private communications between persons, not with public places
such as streetcorners, parks or even transit cars, that have the potential of becoming public forums." 7 Although it is true that the
billing process, like most of the utilities' activities, is regulated by
the state, this does not convert it into a state activity or public
property." Thus, discussion of whether the bill insert is a sufficiently "public" forum to warrant strict judicial scrutiny of contentoriented regulations of communication is misdirected.
Neither of the courts in Con Edison or LILCO held that a compelling justification existed which would have justified a contentoriented regulation of communication. Analysis of Supreme Court
rulings on governmental regulation of first amendment activities
the Court invalidated a city ordinance which precluded all picketing near schools except
peaceful labor picketing. The Court found that under the equal protection clause, as well as
the first amendment itself, government may not open up a forum for public use and then
selectively exclude opinions on the basis of content. Id. at 96.
146. The district court in LILCO acknowledged that the billing envelopes are owned by
the utility company and that, historically, the insert messages have been generated either
by the PSC or LILCO. 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1254. However, because the PSC regulates
the utilities, and hence the billing mechanism, and because the district court was attempting
to determine whether a public forum existed, the fact that inserts were not available for use
by the general public became a significant factor in the court's analysis. Id.
147. Despite the fact that utilities are regulated by the state, the utilization of the U.S.
mails by inserting messages in the envelopes by which the corporation bills its customers is,
essentially, a private act of communication. See Boushey v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 10
PUR4th 23, 38-41 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975) (bill inserts found to be private communication).
148. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974). See notes 87-90 supra
and accompanying text.
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leads to the conclusion that the PSC ban on the use of bill inserts
to convey corporate opinion on controversial matters of public policy unconstitutionally infringes upon the utilities' right to communicate with their subscribers.
III. Commercial Free Speech and the Ban on Advertising
The second major issue faced by the courts in both LILCO and
Con Edison was the utilities' claim that the PSC ban on advertising
violated their first amendment rights." 9 Unlike the ban on bill inserts, this order precluded all speech of a particular nature. No
promotional advertising of electric service was permitted. 50 Until
recent years, such governmental action would have been acceptable
under the old commercial free speech doctrine.' 5 ' The concept that
commercial speech was amenable to governmental regulations
which would not be tolerated where more traditional forms of speech
were involved was articulated by the Supreme Court in Valentine
v. Chrestensen.52 In upholding an ordinance which banned the distribution of commercial advertising in public thoroughfares, the
Court observed, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on regulation by government as respects purely commercial advertising." 53 More recently, however, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. '5 greatly expanded the first amendment protection
afforded to commercial speech. The Court in Virginia State Board
invalidated a state statute which prohibited the advertising of prescription drug prices. 5 The Court ruled that advertising was a matter of public interest and that the free flow of commercial information was indispensable to reliable and informed economic decisionmaking.'5 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has left some room for
distinguishing between commercial speech and other varieties of
speech and the degree of first amendment protection to be afforded
149.
at 1245.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

47 N.Y.2d 94, 100, 390 N.E.2d 749, 751, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 32; 5
47 N.Y.2d 94, 107, 390 N.E.2d 749, 756, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 37.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id.
Id. at 54.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 765.

MED.

L. REP. (BNA)
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respectively.'5 7 In Virginia State Board, the Court tested the validity
of the governmental regulation prohibiting advertising by balancing
the conflicting interests involved.'5 8 As a consequence, proper resolution of any controversy involving commercial speech requires a
balancing of the first amendment interest of the speaker, the interests of the potential recipients and society as a whole in the free flow
of commercial information, and the governmental interest allegedly
served by the regulation.
In employing the balancing of interests approach to promotional
advertising by utilities, the Con Edison and LILCO courts reached
entirely different conclusions. The New York Court of Appeals in
Con Edison felt that promotional advertising by a utility did not
contribute to society's interest in view of the noncompetitive market
in which the corporation operated.' In LILCO, the district court's
view of the balance of the interests was at variance with this evaluation. The district court recognized the obvious economic interest of
the utility in promoting the use of electricity. 6 " Furthermore, the
court felt that truthful advertising on such topics as electric space
heating represented a substantial public interest.' 6' Arrayed against
these factors was the state's interest in curbing growth of electrical
usage.'6 2 The PSC sought to limit the use of electricity indirectly by
"suppressing accurate promotional information."'6 3 The court went
on to note that the
PSC has statutory power to regulate the use of electrical energy directly by
fixing rates, by approving construction of new generating facilities or expansion of existing ones, or by allocating quantities of energy production....
But it may not do so "by keeping the public in ignorance" of the entirely
lawful use of electric space heating."'

The starting point for a proper understanding of the dichotomy
existing between the Con Edison and LILCO decisions lies in analyzing the language by which the Supreme Court in Virginia State
157. Id. at 770-73. See notes 165-69 infra and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 762-70.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

47 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39.
5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) at 1245.

Id.
Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
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Board qualified the first amendment protection to the afforded to
commercial speech. Some forms of governmental regulation perhaps
inconsistent with traditional notions of free speech may be tolerated
where commercial speech is involved." 5 Although neither exhaustive nor all inclusive, the examples of permissible restriction provide
some insight into the potential limits of proper regulation contemplated by the Court. As with all varieties of protected speech, mere
time, place, or manner restrictions may be made provided they meet
the standard criteria for such actions.' Similarly, untruthful, deceptive and misleading advertisements are proper subjects of state
regulation, as are advertisements involving transactions which are
themselves illegal."6 ' Two other areas of special interest also received
mention in Virginia State Board. Broadcasting, due to the very
nature of the medium, is particularly vulnerable to additional restriction.'6 8 Professionals, specifically physicians and attorneys, are
also more amenable to additional control because of the unique
nature of their services.'
Since Virginia State Board was decided, the Court has declared
unconstitutional a number of regulations which imposed complete
bans on commercial advertising. 7 ' An examination of the Supreme
Court's position in these decisions regarding the viability of governmental regulation of commerical speech illustrates the high degree
of first amendment protection afforded to commercial advertising.
For example, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' a state bar association disciplinary rule which prohibited advertising of the prices of
routine legal services was held unconstitutional. The Court stated
that commercial advertising was entitled to first amendment protection. 7 2 The Court held that the interest of society in the free flow
of commercial information relating to the cost of legal services out165. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n. 24 (1976).
166. Id. at 771.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 773. See note 69 supra.
169. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. See notes 171-73, 181-89, 193-201 infra and accompanying
text.
170. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
171. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
172. Id. at 379.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

weighed all asserted state interests.' Although the Court was willing to concede in Virginia State Board that advertising by professionals might be subject to a higher degree of governmental scrutiny, it would not countenance an absolute prohibition on commercial advertising by attorneys.
In Carey v. Population Services International,' the Supreme
Court invalidated a state ban on the advertising of contraceptives.
The Court reiterated the position it took in Virginia State Board
that the state may not completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information concerning a lawful activity even
if the information was of a commercial nature.'75 In noting that the
advertisements could not be characterized as presenting a clear and
present danger, the Court indicated that commercial advertising, at
least where it implicated a fundamental right, would receive a full
measure of first amendment protection and a governmental restriction of speech itself would require a compelling justification. 6
Finally, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro'77
the Court held that a governmental ban on the posting of "For Sale"
signs on residential property was unconstitutional. In reemphasizing that it might be permissible to regulate deceptive commercial
speech, the Court concluded that the ordinance, which impaired
"the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information" was
78
constitutionally infirm.
To be contrasted with the above cases are several recent Supreme
Court decisions upholding less restrictive governmental regulations
of commercial speech.' 9 The Court had indicated earlier that it
173. Id. The Arizona State Bar attempted to justify the ban on advertising by asserting
that advertising would have an adverse effect on professionalism, on the administration of
justice and on the quality of legal services. The Bar also argued the standards would be
difficult to enforce and that any advertising would be inherently misleading and have undesirable economic effects. Id. at 368-79.
174. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
175. Id. at 700.
176. Id. at 701-02. The state attempted to justify the ban on advertising by asserting that
such advertising would be offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that
permitting them would legitimize sexual activity of young people. Id. at 701.
177. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
178. Id. at 98. The town attempted to justify the ban on advertising on the basis that it
was designed to promote stable, racially integrated housing by reducing a perceived apprehension among and flight by white homeowners. Id. at 86-88, 94.
179. Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978).
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would reserve judgment on the degree of first amendment protection
certain professional groups would enjoy.' ° In Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association,8 ' the Court faced a challenge to a state bar association disciplinary rule banning in-person solicitation of clients by
attorneys. Though Ohralik argued that his free speech was implicated and, under Bates, advertising by lawyers was to be accorded
protection, the Court found that in-person solicitation of professional employment does not stand on a par with truthful advertising
about the availability and terms of routine legal services." 2 The
Court held that because of the special status of attorneys, the significant risk of deception and of client pressure inherent in the immediacy of in-person solicitation, and the state's responsibility in
maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions,
the state's substantial interests outweighed any first amendment
interest of the individual attorney.'8 3 A lawyer's procurement of
remunerative employment was characterized as a mode of advertising only marginally affected with first amendment concerns.'84
Seizing upon the language of the Ohralik decision, but not the
carefully constructed rationale, and taking judicial notice of the
energy crisis, the New York court in Con Edison concluded that not
only the mode, but all advertising could be banned to protect society. 8 5 The court noted that "a particular mode of advertising
which would not well serve the societal interest in informed decisionmaking. . . may constitutionally be banned,"' 8 6 and ruled that
advertising by utilities did not serve society's interests and that a
complete ban on promotional advertising, regardless of the mode,
was permissible.'8 This interpretation, however, is not consistent
with the holdings of Ohralik and Bates. In Ohralik, the Supreme
Court had ruled that, given the inherent dangers of in-person solicitation by attorneys, the government might regulate this mode of

180. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 n. 25 (1976).
181. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
182. Id. at 455.
183. Id. at 457, 464.
184. Id. at 459.
185. 47 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
186. Id. at 109, 390 N.E.2d at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
187. Id. at 110, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
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commercial speech.' 8 In Bates, the Court expressly held that an
outright prohibition on commercial advertising by attorneys was
89
unconstitutional.
In addressing the idea that advertising should be banned to shelter society from its effects, the Supreme Court noted:
The argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize
the limitations of advertising, and the public is better kept in ignorance than
trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument
rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubious
any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance. 9

The motivating factor behind the PSC order and the New York
court's approval was a concern about the growth of energy consumption and the effect advertising might have on it."' However, the ban
does not directly affect energy usage one way or the other. It affects
it only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the
free flow of information." 2 The PSC order does not seek to regulate
reasonably the mode or place of advertising, rather, it seeks to abolish utility advertising.
In a more recent case involving the regulation of professional
groups, the Court, in Friedman v. Rogers, "13upheld a state statute
prohibiting optometrists from practicing under trade names. The
Court found that trade names were not on the same footing as
advertisements such as were approved in Virginia State Board and
Bates, even if it was considered a form of "commercial speech.","
The name itself has no intrinsic commercial value or meaning until
it acquires a secondary meaning after a long period of association
in the minds of the consuming public." 5 The state's interests in
regulation were considerable. The possibility of deception was significant,"'6 a factor specifically mentioned in Virginia State Board
188.
189.
190.

436 U.S. at 457-58.
433 U.S. at 379.
Id. at 374-75.

191.

47 N.Y.2d at 110, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39 (1979).

192. The Supreme Court criticized the ban on advertising prices of prescription drugs in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) for the same reason. Id. at 769.
193. 99 S.Ct. 887 (1979).
194. Id. at 895.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 896.
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as a justification for control.' 7 Past practices in the trade prior to
the statute lent credence to this concern.' The individual professional's interest was minimal. The restriction was characterized as
only the most incidental of infringements upon the content of commercial speech.' Optometrists could still advertise prices, types of
services available and the fact that they belonged to a partnership
or association. 0 0 The law did no more than require that commercial
information appear in a form less likely to deceive. 0'
The PSC order banning promotional advertising does not fall
within any of the categories mentioned in Virginia State Board
where more stringent regulation might be desirable. The PSC order
was a total ban, not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.
The advertisements were not considered to be deceptive, misleading
or false nor did they propose any illegal transaction. The corporate
persons involved were not professionals rendering unique services of
an "almost infinite variety and nature, with consequent enhanced
possibilities of confusion or deception." 02 The New York Court of
Appeal's analogy to the cases of regulated professional groups was
inappropriate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently
struck down absolute bans on professional advertising. 03 As the
court observed in LILCO, "[a]lthough the public interests sought
to be served by PSC are important, it is not necessary to suppress
protected speech in order to achieve those ends. .... PSC's ban on
promotional advertising of electricity by public utilities is unconstitutional.' "04
Beyond the fact that the PSC ban did not directly serve the
asserted governmental interest, the district court in LILCO found
that the alleged interest was outweighed by the interests of the
utility and the public in continuing the dissemination of commercial advertising. 05 LILCO's economic interest in promoting the use
197. 425 U.S. at 771.
198. Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887, 895-97 (1979).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976).
203. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

204.

5 MED. L.

205.

Id. at 1245-47.
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(BNA) at 1247.
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of electrical energy and in advertising the availability of its services
was entitled to first amendment protection. 08 The district court also
found that the public interest in the free flow of information on the
use of electrical energy for home heating was significant.2" ' Advertising concerning electrical energy also assists the individual consumer
in making economic decisions concerning the benefits and detriments of electric heat and in choosing among oil, gas or electric
residential heating. ' Finally, advertising by utility corporations
serves a general public interest in ecologically sound, efficient utilization of energy resources.2 9
V.

Conclusion

With environmental concerns and a steadily worsening energy
crisis provoking a clarion call for positive governmental action, emotions easily run in favor of regulations of the nature promulgated by
the New York Public Service Commission. It is in such times that
first amendment rights must be guarded most carefully. The course
of our nation's energy policy is a matter of increasing concern to the
public, the utilities and the government. The merits of each particular alternative may, and should be, the subject of sharp disagreement.
The imposition of a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction
of speech is justifiable provided it leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication, serves a substantial governmental interest and is not content-oriented. 10 The PSC directed its ban on
bill inserts at utility corporation attempts to communicate their
opinion on controversial public policy issues. In doing so, the PSC
imposed an impermissible restraint on the content of protected
speech. Similarly, the prohibition against promotional advertising
by utility corporations constitutes an intolerable restriction on commercial speech.
The reduction of energy consumption and the development of
environmentally sound alternative sources of energy appear to be
both necessary and desirable and may even necessitate the imposi206.
207.
208.

Id. at 15.
Id.at 15-16.
Id. at 16.

209. Id.
210.

425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
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tion of some form of governmental regulation. Unfortunately, if'
the
PSC order as presently formulated actually serves any such function, it does so only at the expense of imposing an impermissible
burden on the first amendment rights of public utility corporations.
Thomas G. Carulli

